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water Policy Decision-Making and 
Jmplementation in the Johnson Administration* 
J-iENRY B. S1RGO 
McNeese State University 
•Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science 
Association, The Shamrock Hilton, Houston, March 16-19, 1983. 
The relationship between policy development and actual implementa-
tion is a topic of continuing concern to political scientists. Accordingly, this 
paper focuses on mutual-role taking 1 and speculative augmentation' by 
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall in his quest to build political support 
for a policy designed to prevent further deterioration of the quality of the 
nation's water. 
Murray Edelman argues that legislatures act primarily within the realm 
of symbolism. 3 His classic example is antitrust legislation w'1ich reassures 
the public that the economy is competitive while leaving economic concen-
tration comfortably intact.• Water pollution legislation similarly has great 
symbolic appeal. 
Legislation to clean up the nation's waters is a "motherhood" consen-
sus issue, particularly for the Democratic party. 5 The Water Quality Act of 
1965 which increased federal funds for sewage treatment plants and charged 
the states with setting and implementing water quality standards passed 
Congress unanimously. 
It was clearly going to be easy to pass a clean water bill in the 89th Con-
gress with its swollen Democratic majorities and Lyndon Johnson in the 
White House. President Eisenhower had vetoed similar water pollution 
legislation in 1960 which had easily passed both Democratic-controlled 
chambers. 6 Findings by Riley Dunlap reveal Democrats to be significantly 
more supportive than Republicans of environmental proposals at both the 
legislative and congressional levels. 1 Furthermore, 860Jo of the American 
public in a 1965 Gallup poll supported the idea of a strong clean water program.' 
Udall's two big concerns were to see that legislation which passed could 
be implemented effectively and to nurture in-depth political support for en-
vironmentalism among the public, state and local authorities and federal 
administrators.' Despite the favorable auguries of Democratic control and 
public support, there was cause for concern. 
John Kennedy's main issue concerning water in the 1960 presidential 
campaign was that the Eisenhower administration did not build enough 
dams. True, Kennedy did come to support water pollution legislation; and 
Johnson, with visions of conservationist Franklin Roosevelt in his mind, 
did so even more enthusiastically. 10 Obviously, presidential support could 
wax and just as easily wane. Udall also perceived public support as being 
superficial. There is evidence to suggest that there is misperception concern-
ing support for environmental measures even among self-styled "en-
vironmentalists." Stephen Cotgrove found environmental concern to be 
widespread and only modestly related to demographic variables such as in-
come, education, and occupational status in Great Britain, Germany, 
Australia, and the United States. 11 Lester Milbrath in 1976 surveyed the 
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views of leaders " . . . representative of those who were most likely to Par-
ticipate in the development of the water quality plan ... " for the Niagar 
Frontier, a two-county region in New York . 12 Sixty-two percent of tha 
public believed that cleaning up the water would create more jobs and on) e 
10 or 11 percent maintained that it would reduce the number of jobs 1~ 
Among two subgroups of leaders, elected officials and enviro nrnentalisis 
all of whom believed that clean water and jobs were compati ble, majoritie~ 
believed that the public felt that there had to be a choice between jobs and 
clean water. 14 The putlook of the environmentalists is striki ngly similar to 
views expressed by Udall. 15 
In order for protection of the environment in general and clean-up of 
the nation's waters in particular to take place, Udall argued that the public 
had to be educated. Moreover, the Interior Department was to play a 
leading role in the development of an environmental conscio usness which 
was quite distinctive from the conservation orientation of the Theodore and 
Franklin Roosevelt eras. 16 It is interesting to note that Cotgrove's 
Catastrophe <?r Cornucopia has as its central theme that the " new" en-
vironmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s differed radically from earlier en-
vironmental efforts. 11 Indeed, he sees conflict between those of the older 
perspective who care about the environment and those of the newer perspec-
tive who perceive a fragile spaceship earth that should ret urn to a pre-
industrial past. At any rate, he does suggest that environ mental con-
sciousness has changed, at least among a significant portion of the populace 
of the four nations of Great Britain, Germany, Australia and the United 
States . Heightened public concern about the environment was a goal of 
Stewart Udall. 
Udall was also concerned that water pollution policy have a strong 
organizational basis.' 8 This comports nicely with the following passage by 
Murray Edelman: 
Establishment of a function at the highest hierar -
chical level is symbolically important only where there is 
genuine doubt about its high valuation or political sup-
port . . .' 9 
Despite Udall's support for action in the field of water pollut ion by the 
federal government from the beginning of his tenure as Secretary of the In-
terior, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare actually housed 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration which was responsible 
for implementation of the Water Quality Act of 1965, and H .E.W. had for-
mal jurisdiction in the field of water pollution. 2° Indeed, apparently in 
recognition of this formal jurisdiction, no invitations to the signing of the 
Water Quality Act of 1965 were extended to members of Interior , while 
H.E.W. was well represented. 21 But by 1966, largely because of Udall's 
strong enthusiasm about water pollution clean-up efforts, the water pollu-
tion control functions vested by law in the Department of Healt h, Educa-
tion, and Welfare were transferred to the Department of Interio r. 22 
The following passage from a memorandum dated January 11, 1966, 
to President Johnson from Lee C. White, Assistant Special Counse l, clearly 
indicated that the transfer was perceived as having symbolic as well as 
managerial significance: 
The proposed reorganization would serve to concentrate 
in a single Federal agency presently dispersed authorities 
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for the management, development and conservation of 
water resources. The emphasis would be shifted from 
water pollution as primarily a health problem to pollu-
tion control as an integral element in the general 
management of our water resources. 23 
It was also seen as advantageously providing for the consolidation of 
research programs and programs concerned with water quality standards. 2• 
The memorandum noted: 
... Interior's data acquisition network is required to 
meet the water quality measurement requirements of all 
Federal agencies and provide water quality measure-
ments common to the needs of two or more agencies ... 
Transfer of abatement enforcement measures to In-
terior would bring within the jurisdiction of one depart-
ment most of the programs relating to water quality 
standards. 25 
Disadvantages were cited by White as well. 
White noted that there may be a conflict of interest between water 
pollution control and natural resources projects. For instance, Interior has 
a developmental interest in mining operations which constitute a serious 
source of water pollution. 26 He cited problems concerning congressional 
committee relations involving water pollution control and administration of 
water pollution programs in states and communities. Interior programs 
were generally referred to ". . . congressional committees dominated by 
western members, whereas pollution problems stem from industrial and 
municipal sources in the urban East. ... " 21 Also, H.E. W. has considerable 
expf;!rience working through state and local agencies; whereas, Interior did 
not have such expertise. 28 
Stewart Udall saw these problems as having the kernels of excellent 
political opportunities for the Department of Interior and its mission of 
raising environmental consciousness. Interior is perceived as being a 
~-estern and a rural department. The former is most visibly symbolized by 
the fact that virtually every Secretary of the Interior has been from the West. 
By shifting responsibility for water pollution to Interior, Udall hoped to na-
tionalize the concerns and the constituency of Interior, since Eastern states 
particularly urban ones, clearly have a stake in water pollution policy. 29 It 
should be added that he thought that because of its arid nature the ecology 
of the West was highly fragile and that current levels of water quality there 
had to be maintained. 30 This change would augment other moves to build 
up programmatic responsibilities in the East such as the launching in 1961 of 
the National Seashore Preservation Program. Nantuckett in President Kennedy's 
home state of Massachusetts was the first area designated a national 
seashore. The Padre Islands in then Vice-President Johnson's home state of 
Texas were the second such designated site. 3 ' Moreover, Udall saw a splen-
did opportunity for Interior to build a base in state and local agencies, par-
ticularly urban ones, through the necessity of having to develop expertise 
and administrative mechanisms to administer grant-in-aid funds for the 
construction of sewage treatment plants. He maintained that this would set 
the stage for increasing the concern of citizens with the urban environment 
and the quality of life in the city, where most Americans spent most of their 
lives. 32 
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Opposition to the transfer of functions from H.E.W. to Interior was 
voiced by Charles L. Schultze, Director of the Bureau of the Budget. He 0 posed it because he believed that Secretary John Gardner of the Departme~; 
of Health, Education and Welfare was more competent than Udall 11 
Schultze was keenly interested in experimenting with effluent fees to cu~b 
air and water pollution. Indeed, in 1977, he published The Public Use of th 
Private Interest which dealt with the topic. i< Aside from the question 0~ 
competency, Schultze's chief argument involved the relationship of sym. 
bolism to enforcement. The following is a passage from a memora ndum to 
President Johnson: 
As a practical matter, bringing enforcement actions in 
the name of public health is much more likely to pro-
duce results than using the natural resource or recrea-
tion rationale. Moving the program to Interior seriously 
weakens its ties to a public health orientation. 35 
Symbolism was prominent in the reasoning of both Charles Schultze and 
Stewart Udall, and both individuals had doubts about adequate support for 
the realization of environmental clean-up in general and water pollution 
control in particular. The chief distinction seems to be that Schultze was 
primarily concerned about achieving relatively specific goals, and that Udall 
additionally wished and believed that he could impart an environmental 
ideology or consciousness. Both men engaged in mutual-ro le taking and 
were cognizant that while virtually everyone may harbor a primeval need to 
favor clean water, individuals such as governors concerned about industrial 
growth and their own electability may be a lot less enthusiastic about the 
means to achieving that lofty end. 
Senator Edmund Muskie, chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and 
Water Pollution of the Committee on Public Works and of the Subcommit-
tee on Intergovernmental Relations, worked closely with the administration 
in the passage of the Water Quality Act of 1965. 36 During his governship of 
Maine, he ". . . had initiated a state program to upgrade the quality of 
water in Maine streams-an action propelled in part by the dependence of 
the Maine lobster industry on the purity of coastal waters. " 17 He supported 
the idea of eventually transferring the Federal Water Pollution Control Ad-
ministration to Interior, but argued that water quality policy had to evolve 
further for such a move to be organizationally sound and politically feasi-
ble. He maintained that experience with implementation of the policy would 
provide needed information for the resolution of organizational questions. 
He noted: 
The result (of the Water Quality Act) has been a flood 
of new ideas . . . industrial incentives, regional water 
and sewer systems, water transfers, effluent taxes and 
expanded grants . . . Implicit is the question of 
reorganization and rationalization of our water supply 
and waste treatment programs. H 
Muskie anticipated the "fixing" of organizational problems durin g the im-
plementation stage of the Water Quality Act. According to Eugene Bardach, 
such a view may be wise since '' ... good policy development is learning by 
doing." 19 
Far more significantly, he argued that such a transfer within six months 
of passage of the Water Quality Act would create political problems for 
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president Johnson. Muskie was himself engaged in delicate negotiations 
with representatives of the wood pulp industry concerning implementation 
of the act and feared that they, as well as other industrialists and state and 
local officials, would find such a transfer confusing . Republicans could use 
such a situation to add strength to charges of "Administration confusion" 
which were already being successfully leveled against · the Poverty 
program .•0 
Despite opposition from Schultze and Muskie, Udall's wishes prevailed 
and the Department of Interior assumed responsibility for the program on 
May 10, 1966." The transfer comports will with James Davis' criteria con-
cerning the likelihood of reorganization proposals being accepted. 42 He sees 
presidential support and intensity of feeling as constituting crucial factors. 
Udall, who served for eight years as Secretary of Interior, had President 
Johnson's confidence and was able to achieve his support for the 
proposal. 4 3 Udall was far more intense in his support for the proposal than 
Schultze and Muskie were in their opposition to it. 
On the day that responsibility was assumed, Secretary Udall issued the 
Guidelines for Establishing Water Quality Standards. It was emphasized 
that Interior " ... was not prepared to approve standards submitted by the 
states unless they provided for upgrading waters now polluted and protect-
ing waters already clean.,, .. The guidelines clearly embodied "speculative 
augmentation" akin to that cited by Charles 0. Jones concerning passage 
of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 in the following passage: 
That the technology was not available for meeting the 
1975 (auto emission) standards in the Senate bill was in-
disputable. In fact, Senator Muskie pointed out in the 
floor debate that technology was rejected as a basis for 
decisions in this area. "The deadline is based not, I 
repeat, on economic and technological feasibility, but 
on consideration of public health.,,., 
In other words, the authority granted in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 
was " ... based in large measure on 'speculation' that capabilities would 
improve to meet demands of the law. " 46 
In an oral history by Stewart Udall, he freely admitted that there were 
technical difficulties in measuring water quality. 4 7 Criteria established for 
quality in early efforts were " ... based largely on physical and chemical 
conditions. " 48 Jerry I. Wilhm and Troy C. Dorris in a 1968 Bio Science arti-
cle noted the following : 
The attempt to establish criteria in terms of toxicity of 
chemicals to aquatic organisms may exceed the capability 
of adequate testing · due to the large number of toxic 
compounds, the vast number of biotic species, the ef-
fects of interactions among compounds, and the wide 
range of effects produced by variations in physical and 
chemical conditions. 
We propose the establishment of water quality 
criteria by the evaluation of biological conditions ex-
isting in receiving streams. Effluents produce striking 
changes in the structure of the benthic macroinvertebrate 
community. A distinctive longitudinal series of popula-
tions can be identified in a polluted stream until water 
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quality and biotic structure approach the normal situation . •9 
It is worth emphasizing that the above was published nearly three ·yea 
after the ~assa~e _of ~he Wa~er Q~ality Act of 1965_. So, there were clear~s 
technological hm1tat1ons which hmdered the establishment of viable wat/ 
quality criteria. But, concerned about the loss of political mome ntum th r 
Department of Interior pressed hard for states to submit the best pos~ibl: 
standards. 50 
Interior initially promulgated some water quality standards which con-
flicted with its long range goals, but such criteria were perhaps necessary to 
get the program off to a strong start. Concerning treatment for municipal 
and industrial wastes, Interior required '' . . . that secondary treatment 
(85% removal of biochemical oxygen demand-BOD) would be the 
minimum degree acceptable ... " 51 This blanket standard allow ed the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration to avoid negotiating 
quagmires with state officials and seemed "fair. " 52 But, such a standard 
was questionable in terms of economic efficiency and led one group of 
researchers to ask the following: 
''Why go through the business of setting stream stand-
ards if they are not indeed being used as the basis for 
developing treatment requirements?" 53 
Such arbitrary standards which were " ... unrelated to water quality of 
receiving bodies ... , " also hindered regional or river basin water quality 
management 5•....:...a long range goal of Secretary Udall. 55 
Interior was conscious of the importance of the image which it pro-
jected during the initial stages of implementation of the Water Quality Act. 
It feared being labeled "pro-industry" and maintained the followi ng: 
A degradation of water quality in standards of even 1 
part per million of oxygen is a 'license to pollute' and 
may be interpreted as weakening, having a bad psycho-
logical effect on municipal and state government people 
working for clean water, on the general public and 
voters on bond issues. 56 
This policy was of particular concern to Governor Tim M. Babcock of 
Montana 57 and Governor Stan Hathaway of Wyoming both of whom main-
tained that their waters were pristine and wanted to induce ind ustries to 
locate in their respective states. 58 Interior did not want to be perce ived as 
caving in to pressure at the earliest stages of implementation, nor wish to 
engage in litigation with the states at such a point in time. The stat es were 
responsible for establishing their own standards. If these were not accept-
able to the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, then the 
Secretary of Interior would be impowered to draft standards for the state in 
questions. It was believed that rejection of irlitial efforts at standard-se tting by 
several states would instill fear among the remaining states and result in 
"stronger, more viable standards." 59 State and local government of ficials 
were not the only parties whose cooperation was vital for success ful im-
plementation. 
There was great concern about the reaction of industry. At the time of 
the passage of the legislation, Senator Muskie had engaged in delicate 
negotiations with the wood and pulp industry. 60 The seminal water pollu-
tion legislation which passed in 1924 dealt specifically with oil discharges 
from ships. 61 The oil industry sought to be involved in the formulat ion of 
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water pollution legislation in 1965 and with its implementation later. 
Jn response to the section of President Johnson's State of the Union 
message pertaining to air and water conservation, Frank N. Ikard of the 
American Petroleum Institute wrote the following: 
You have a pledge of full cooperation from the 
American Petroleum Institute, and the industry it 
serves, to help in any way we can to further effective, 
well-founded air and water conservation programs. 
To this end, we will be glad to provide scientists 
and other experts to meet with those in your administra-
tion who will be working in this vital field and to share 
with them the information and experience the petroleum 
industry has acquired through years of research and 
practical application of discoveries. 62 
President Johnson invited a small group from the oil industry to meet with 
him to provide input into pollution legislation. 63 A letter from Bill Moyers, 
Special Assistant to the President, to Frank Ikard expressed marked en-
thusiasm about the prospect of oil industry scientists aiding air and water 
conservation efforts. 6' The exchanges between the American Petroleum In-
stitute and the White House are thought-provoking . 
One can easily speculate about and ascribe motives to Frank Ikard's 
letter of January 21, 1965. He could have been genuinely concerned about 
the quality of pollution research, he could have recognized the "inevitability" 
of the passage of some type of conservation legislation in 1965 and sought 
to have as much influence as possible on its formulation and implementa-
tion. Moyer's response perhaps is indicative of a desire on the part of the 
White House to "co-opt" the oil industry. A fascinating study could focus 
on the role which oil industry scientists have _played in the implementation of 
water pollution legislation. Indeed, the systematic study by political scien-
tists of the role of industrial scientists in public policy areas would be highly 
valuable. Clearly, values are involved in such endeavors. W. Henry Lambright 
and Albert H. Teich in a discussion of the role of the scientist as policy ad-
visor wrote the following: 
Most of the time, the questions that policy-makers want 
to pose to their science advisors are of the type 
Weinberg has called "trans-science." They are ques-
tions that involve an amalgam of facts and values or 
that require the application of seasoned judgment. They 
are, are in a fundamental sense, beyond the power of 
science to answer. Furthermore, they are usually ques-
tions about which expert scientists disagree, questions 
such as those concerning the safety of civilian nuclear 
reactors. 6 i 
The oil industry continues to figure prominently in discussions of water 
pollution. 
Oil discoveries off of the California coast drew national attention in 
1982 as is suggested in the following passage: 
The potential size of the new discoveries near the 
western end of the channel is so great that environmen-
talists say they fear irresistible federal and corporate 
pressure to open offshore areas further up the coast 
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(from the Santa Barbara channel) to oil drilling, par-
ticularly since California's Democratic governor, 
Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown Jr., an active opponent of 
much offshore drilling, is about to be succeeded by 
Republican George Deukmejian. 66 
The above passage is also suggestive of the dynamic nature of federalisrn 
which has been cited by Morton Grodzins. 67 During the Johnson ad-
ministr~tion,_ Udall per~eived the role of !~e Int~rior Department as being 
one of mducmg lethargic states and locahties to implement effective water 
pollution control policies. In the above instance and others, we have Reagan 
administration officals allegedly restraining what they perceive as 
overzealous environmentally-oriented state officials. 61 Such developments 
suggest the logic of what Paul Sabatier describes as "the strategy of en-
vironmental groups" in the following passage: 
While supporting the expansion of the scope of the con-
flict to the Federal government, they have continued to 
focus considerable attention on pollution control pro-
grams at the state and local level. In part, of course, this 
is a recognition of the crucial role of these "lower" 
levels of government in implementing Federal standards. 
At the same time, they have pressed for more stringent 
regulations by state and local authorities, thereby in-
dicating an implicit awareness of what might be called 
"the principle of beneficient overlap:" the more 
governmental units involved concurrently in regulatory 
activity, the greater the probability that one of them will 
adopt and aggressively enforce stringent regulations. 69 
The Water Quality Act of 1965 had a modest effect on the quality of 
America's waters. 10 It was supplemented by the Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972 (PL 92-500) which established " . .. zero 
discharge standards for 1985. " 11 Hence, states no longer will be responsible 
for developing water quality standards. But, against the context of federal 
pollution enforcement budget cuts, the standards are likely to be realized or 
approached only if there is vigorous action by state and local officials. 12 
There may well be such action. The traditional pre-eminence of states and 
localities as environmental managers, albeit more concerned ones, may be 
re-established. 73 They may conceivably lobby for more rather than less ac-
tion by the national government. 
Such developments to the extent that, and if, they occur will in a sense 
be ironic. But, such developments would underscore the importance of sym-
bolism in politics and suggest that Udall was correct to see the most impor-
tant mission of the Department of Interior as being educational. 
Of course, it is open to question how much effect, if any, the Depart-
ment of Interior's efforts in the 1960s had on raising environmental con-
sciousness among state officials and the general public. This should be the 
subject of empirical research. 
60 
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